Abstract: This paper provides evidence on the investment behavior of 27 state pension plans that manage their own equity portfolios. Even though these state plans typically hold broadly diversified portfolios, they substantially over-weight the equity of companies that are headquartered in-state. The over-weighting of within-state stocks by these plans is three times larger than that of other institutional investors. We explore three possible reasons for this instate bias: familiarity bias, information-based investing, and political considerations. While there is a substantial preference for in-state stocks, there is no similar tilt toward holding stocks from neighboring states or out-of-state stocks in the state's primary industry. States generate excess returns through their in-state investment activities, particularly among smaller stocks in the state's primary industry. We also find that state pension plans are more likely to hold a withinstate stock if the headquarters of the firm is located in a county that gave a high fraction of its campaign contributions to the current governor. These politically-motivated holdings yield excess returns for the pension fund.
Introduction
By nearly any measure, state and local pension plans are important institutions in the U.S. economy. Public defined benefit plans held assets of over $3.7 trillion in 2014 1 (Federal Reserve, 2014) . With more than a third of these assets held in corporate stocks, public pensions account for approximately 6 percent of the ownership of the U.S. stock market. 2 In terms of participants, the U.S. Census Bureau reports that there were nearly 20 million members in state and local retirement plans in 2012, with over 9 million receiving benefit payments. 3 Because the responsibility for funding these defined benefit (DB) plans lies with the sponsoring government, taxpayers that are not employed in the public sector also have a stake in how these pension plans are managed. Thus, the investment decisions of these pension systems are of substantial interest to state employees as well as the general public.
Although most state and local plans outsource their asset management activities to outside money management companies, many of the larger state plans internally manage their own equity portfolios. This raises natural questions about how well these states manage their equity portfolios. This is of particular concern because public pensions operate in a more politically-charged environment than private pensions. In this paper, we reconstruct the detailed equity portfolios of the 27 state pension plans that, for at least part of our sample period, managed their own U.S equity investments. We analyze these equity portfolios for in-state investment bias and, given the evidence of a substantial bias, we examine explanations for and the consequences of over-weighting in-state stocks. bias of 76%. This tilt toward within-state stocks is three times larger than the 24% within-state bias that Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010) found for institutional money managers in general.
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The evidence of in-state bias is particularly interesting given the intuition of standard portfolio theory in the presence of risky income from other sources. This theory suggests that, all else equal, state governments should optimally under-weight in-state stocks rather than overweight them, because each state's economic activity, tax revenue, and the income of state residents is more positively correlated with the performance of in-state stocks compared to other stocks. For example, if the economy of California is highly correlated with the performance of the high-tech industry, then standard tax or consumption smoothing models would lead
California to under-weight tech stocks in order to ensure that the pension does not lose value at precisely the same time that California is experiencing economic difficulties or fiscal pressures.
To over-weight in-state stocks is analogous to an individual investing in the stock of her own employer. Doing so increases the correlation between labor income and stock performance.
This decision would increase, rather than decrease, the overall portfolio risk. Indeed, we find, controlling for year and state effects, that the return on the stock investments in a state pension plan is strongly correlated with growth in state tax revenue during the next year.
Given the intuition that counsels against an in-state bias, and the potential costs of this lack of diversification, why might states still choose to use this approach? We explore three reasons. The first is familiarity bias, or put simply, the tendency for people and institutions to invest in what they know (Huberman, 2001) . 6 A key feature of familiarity bias is that it is not information-based, i.e., investing in the familiar does not lead to excess returns. If local investing induces a positive correlation between the state's economy and its pension fund performance while delivering no excess returns, then the citizens of the state would experience a welfare loss as a result of this in-state investment bias because of the extra risk involved (i.e., when the pension fund is performing poorly, state tax revenue is also in decline).
A second possible reason for the in-state bias is that the officials making the investment decisions have an information advantage with regard to in-state stocks. Evidence of an information advantage for local investors has been found in many other contexts, including institutional money managers (e.g., Moskowitz, 2001, and Baik, Kang, and Kim, 2010) , individual investors (e.g., Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005) , equity analysts (e.g., Malloy, 2005, and Bae, Stulz, and Tan, 2008) , and "block" acquirers of corporate shares (Kang and Kim, 2008) . There are two distinctions between the "familiarity" explanation and the "information" explanation. First, and most importantly, the latter implies excess returns while the former does not. Second, familiarity based on geography or industry should be associated with greater holdings of stocks located in nearby states as well as greater holdings of out-of-state stocks in a state's dominant industry.
A third possible explanation is that state pension plan investment allocations are affected by political considerations. The first two explanations are typically distinguished on the basis of whether the returns on local (or in this case, in-state) investments outperform non-local investments. The relevance of the third explanation is evaluated by examining the link between investment decisions and various measures of political activity (e.g. voting patterns and campaign contribution data for the most recent gubernatorial election cycle). It is worth noting employer stock in their 401(k) plan do not outperform companies with lower concentrations of ownership in employer stock.
that these three explanations are not mutually exclusive, and all three could contribute to the overweighting of within-state stocks.
Our evidence is supportive of an information-based explanation and is not consistent with broad-based familiarity tied to geography or industry. For example, although state pension fund managers invest disproportionately in the within-state stocks in the state's primary industry (e.g., energy for Texas, finance for New York, business equipment/computers for California), they do not favor out-of-state stocks in this same dominant home-state industry. In addition, the performance results suggest that information advantages stop at the borders of the state. While the evidence is consistent with there being an information-based rationale for overweighting in-state stocks, we also find evidence suggesting the relevance of political factors.
We obtain gubernatorial campaign contribution data from the Institute on Money in State Politics and gubernatorial election data from Polidata. These datasets allow us to link county-level campaign contributions and electoral outcomes to the county where a firm is headquartered. The evidence indicates that state pension plans are more likely to hold a within-state firm in its portfolio if the county where the firm is located gave a high fraction of its campaign contributions in the last election to the current governor. Interestingly, the performance of instate investments is strongest for stocks in the counties that gave the current governor the highest fraction of their financial support during the preceding election cycle, with these potentially politically connected holdings earning risk-adjusted returns that are 5.7% higher on an annual basis than the stocks from the counties that were less generous to the governor. Although we are unable, due to data limitations, to further identify the channel through which political connections influence state pension plans, our results are consistent with the importance of networking in fund management (as found in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) ) and research on political contributions/connections and stock returns (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) ).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior literatures on state pension plans and their investment behavior as well as the literature in finance about local investing.
Section 3 documents the U.S. equity holdings of state pension plans that decide to manage their own stock investments and the evidence of a strong in-state bias. Implications of the within-state bias are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and offers extensions.
Prior Literatures on State Pension Plan Investment Behavior and Local Investing

State Pension Plan Investment Behavior
Despite the importance of state and local plans, the empirical literature analyzing their investment behavior is rather small. This fact is explained largely by data limitations. Early papers relied primarily on the PenData data, which was derived from a survey of state and local pension plans conducted on an irregular basis from the late 1980s through the late 1990s. Useem and Mitchell (2000) provided evidence that governance policies -most notably independent performance evaluations -influenced asset allocation at broad levels, such as the mix of equity and fixed income investments, the share of non-U.S. assets, and whether a plan contracts externally for asset management. Coronado, Engen, and Knight (2003) showed that public pension plans earned a lower rate of return than private plans in 1998, but the authors were unable to determine whether this under-performance was reflected different allocations across broad asset classes or inferior investment selection abilities within an asset class. Munnell & Sunden (2001) discuss that in the early 1980s, some public plans sacrificed returns for "social considerations," but that plan managers became increasingly sophisticated and (at the time of their study) performed on par with their private sector counterparts.
More recent studies have used other data sources. Munnell, Haverstick, Soto, and Aubry (2008) use data from the Census of Governments to obtain an understanding of the broader universe of public plans, including more than 2,000 locally-administered plans. Even though each of these studies provided useful insights on asset allocation, none of the authors had data on the specific securities held by public plans. Thus, the authors were unable to investigate the existence or extent of any in-state portfolio bias. The key advantage of our data is the specific information about the decision of a pension plan to hold a particular stock. This level of detail enables us to not only document in-state investment bias, but also differentiate among competing explanations for it. Analysis at the security level allows us to control for differing riskiness across various potential stock investments and enables us to link characteristics of the firm and the location of the firm's headquarters to whether the state pension fund decides to hold that firm's stock.
Only one other study has been able to examine the in-state bias and performance of public pensions using detailed portfolio data. Hochberg and Rauh (2013) investments, whereas we document over-performance in within-state public-equity holdings.
Local Investing
A growing literature in finance documents that many different types of investors seem to tilt their portfolio holdings toward local investments and, further, make better stock picks or recommendations concerning firms that are geographically proximate. The interpretation of this finding is that investors located closer to a potential investment may have more information concerning that investment than more distant investors. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) examine the holdings of U.S. mutual fund managers and find a local bias in their holdings. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) further find that mutual fund managers' local investments (defined as investments in firms located within 100 kilometers of the manager) outperform their non-local investments by 2.65% per year. However, since mutual fund managers may target a particular benchmark index, the extent to which they can tilt their portfolio toward local stocks appears to be limited -the bias in aggregated mutual fund holdings is only 13% (mutual fund managers invest 7% in local stocks; if they all simply invested in the stock market, the percent of local holdings would be 6.2%). Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010) analysts' information advantage in a non-U.S. setting. Kang and Kim (2008) find that local acquirers of a "block" of corporate shares engage in more monitoring than do more distant acquirers, with the more local target earning a higher return on the announcement of the acquisition and having better post-acquisition operating performance.
Finally, individual investors exhibit a strong local bias in both their 401(k) plan through investments in employer stock (Benartzi, 2001 ) and through their direct stock holdings outside of their retirement plan (Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005) . Indeed, the local bias among individual investors is substantially larger than that for institutions: the typical individual holds one-third of their stock portfolio in local stocks, whereas if they instead invested in the overall market, the fraction of local stocks would be just over one-tenth. Benartzi (2001) the state plans that are included in our data, the first and last quarters that they appear in our sample (we collected holdings data each quarter through the third quarter of 2008), and the total number of quarters in which they appear in the sample. A few of these states, such as Colorado and Michigan, invest the assets of multiple state pension systems together as one, so these 27 state pension plans are represented by 20 separate investment funds.
We can compare the characteristics of these plans to the ones not in our sample using data from the 2007 Wilshire report on the financial status of state pension plans. There is some confusion in the academic literature over the filing requirements for form 13F. For example, Badrinath and Wahal (2002) suggest that the filing of a 13F is voluntary for public pension plans. Our discussions with the relevant SEC staff, however, suggest that state pensions with more than $100 million in 13F assets are, in fact, required to file. Thus, the absence of many state pensions from the data is due to the use of investment managers under whose name the assets are reported, not due to the absence of a requirement to report.
Wilshire report, these 21 plans manage more than half (53 percent) of all the state pension plan assets.
As these figures suggest, it is primarily the very large plans that manage their own equity portfolio: the median size of the plans in our sample was $54.9 billion in 2007, compared with a median size of $8.6 billion for plans outside of our sample. These large plans tend to hold a slightly higher fraction (43%) of their overall portfolio in equities than do the smaller plans not in our sample (41%). Finally, for state pension plans that report U.S. stock holdings on form 13F, these stock holdings represent the vast majority of the plans total U.S. equity ownership (obtained by comparing total 13F holdings with total U.S. equity holdings in the Wilshire report). As seen in Table 2 , the U.S. stock holdings reported on the 13F represent approximately four fifths of total U.S. equity holdings for half of the plans in 2007.
Using the 13F data, we are able to construct the self-managed equity portfolios for these plans. Our data spans 115 quarters (from the first quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2008),
although not all plans manage their own portfolio over the entire sample period. We will report the state pension plans' equity allocation by size (S&P 500 versus smaller companies) and by industry classification (we use a 12-industry classification, focusing on the largest industry for a given state). 10 We also compare the pension plan weights of their U.S. equity investments to the weights of these particular categories of stocks in the entire U.S. stock market.
Is There an In-State Bias?
10 The industry classifications are from Ken French's website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html. The 12 broad industry categories are: 1) consumer nondurables; 2) consumer durables; 3) manufacturing; 4) energy (e.g., oil); 5) chemicals and allied products; 6) business equipment (e.g., computers/software); 7) telecommunications; 8) utilities; 9) wholesale, retail and some services; 10) healthcare; 11) finance; and 12) "other". Table 3 provides the first evidence that state pension plans managing their own equity portfolios exhibit a substantial in-state bias in their stock holdings. A firm is defined as being instate if it is headquartered in the same state as the pension plan. In rows 1 through 6, we compare in-state and out-of-state stock holdings -further delineated by large (S&P 500) stocks versus smaller (non-S&P 500) stocks -to the holdings we would expect if these plans simply held a value-weighted index for the entire U.S. stock market. We report portfolio shares on a value-weighted basis -in other words, we simply add up the asset holdings across all 27 plans in our sample for each quarter, compute the portfolio shares for this overall state pension plan portfolio, and then take the average of these shares across the 115 quarters. These valueweighted state-pension plan holdings over the 115 quarters of the sample are then compared to the average quarterly stock-market weights.
On a value-weighted basis, the plans in our sample hold 9.7 percent of their portfolio in States exhibiting an in-state bias would seem to be ignoring the initial intuition of most financial economists because this bias would appear to be increasing, rather than decreasing, the volatility of the state's overall fiscal "portfolio" -more on this in Section 4.1 and Table 4 .
Relative to other institutional money managers, a state pension fund manager should also account for the background risk of the state financial situation. For example, if the economy of Texas (and consequently the state's budget balance) is correlated with the performance of the oil industry, it would be unwise from a diversification perspective for state pension plans in Texas to invest heavily in oil stocks. Indeed, Texas might increase the benefits of diversification by holding airline stocks that do particularly well when oil prices are low.
Prior work on the returns to local information suggests that information advantages are most likely to exist for smaller, non-S&P 500, companies (Ivkovich and Weisbenner, 2005) . The intuition is simply that it would be difficult to maintain an informational advantage on the large firms which are national in scope, that tend to have dedicated analysts at leading investment firms, and that receive prominent coverage from the business press. To the extent that informational advantages exist for investments in local firms, therefore, they are likely to be concentrated in smaller firms that receive less national attention.
At first blush, this within-state bias of state pension plans appears to be concentrated in larger S&P 500 stocks, whereas the in-state non-S&P 500 stocks are held in the same proportion as in the market portfolio (rows 2 and 3). However, once one considers that these pension plans underweight small company stocks in general by a wide margin, it becomes clear that the in-state bias is present in the selection of smaller stocks. For example, out-of-state small company stock comprises nearly 27% of the market portfolio, but only 14% of the portfolio of state pension plans (row 6). Thus, while in-state non-S&P 500 stocks comprise 9.7% of all non-S&P 500 stocks in the state pension portfolios (1.5 / 15.5), they account for only 5.3% of the market weight of all non-S&P 500 stocks (1.5 / 28.3), indicating a substantial within-state bias. would be coded as "Largest industry = 1" for California PERS and California Teachers, but would be coded as "Largest industry = 0" for all other plans in states for which technology is not the largest industry. The within-state bias of pension plan holdings for stocks in the state's largest industry is 89% (3.7% of the portfolio but only 2.0% of the market benchmark; row 10), while the out-of-state bias for stocks in the largest industry in the pension plan's home state is zero (e.g., investments by the California plans in technology companies in Washington; row 11). 12 We define the largest industry of a state as being the industry with the largest share of aggregate market capitalization of all public-traded firms in the state at the end of the prior quarter. The industry that is most frequently the largest industry for the 17 states that have pension plans with 13F holdings in our sample are as follows: Alaska -telecommunications; California -business equipment (e.g., computers/software); Coloradotelecommunications; Florida -finance; Illinois -manufacturing; Kentucky -wholesale, retail, and some services; Maryland -manufacturing; Michigan -consumer durables (e.g., cars); Missouri -consumer nondurables; Montana -utilities; New Mexico -finance; New York -finance; Ohio -chemicals and allied products; Pennsylvaniafinance; Texas -energy (e.g., oil); Virginia -consumer nondurables; Wisconsin -manufacturing. Thus, there is considerable diversity of the largest industry across these states as of the 12 Fama-French industries, 10 of them are the "largest industry" of at least one state (the exceptions being health care and "other").
Implications and Explanations of the In-State Bias
Do Pension Stock Holdings Exacerbate or Mitigate State Fiscal Risks?
The data on portfolio holdings clearly indicate that there exists an in-state bias. Before turning to an analysis of why state pension plans might choose this approach, it is instructive to consider whether this in-state bias is likely to have welfare consequences aside from any differences in returns. The intuition from standard economic models would suggest that a state pension plan would want to avoid investing in securities whose returns are more positively correlated with the home state's tax revenues than other stocks; otherwise, the state will observe a greater decline in its pension assets at the same time that it is also experiencing negative shocks to its tax revenue. Table 4 reports the correlations of the growth in annual state tax revenue with both the contemporaneous and lagged annual returns on the self-managed U.S. equity portion of the state pension plan from an OLS regression that also includes both year and state fixed effects. The inclusion of year fixed effects assures that the correlation between the growth in state tax revenue and state pension plan performance is identified by variation in plan stock holdings (and their performance) across states as opposed to simple time-series variation in economy-wide factors, such as the U.S. stock market. We find that there is zero correlation with contemporaneous pension returns and the growth in state tax revenue (column 1), but a positive correlation emerges when we lag returns by one year (column 2). Specifically, in column 2, we find a positive coefficient of 0.16 on the one-year-lagged state pension return on U.S. stock
holdings. This lead-lag relation likely reflects the fact that stocks are typically leading indicators of changes in a state's economy. These changes are then reflected in tax revenue growth a year later. Thus, state plans are investing in a manner that creates a positive correlation between this year's pension returns on U.S. stock investments and the subsequent year's growth in tax revenue over and above the baseline correlation between tax revenue growth and the U.S. stock market index. Given the within-state bias in stock investments by state pension plans documented in Table 3 , this higher correlation should not be a surprise.
Familiarity versus Information: Do States Earn Excess Returns from their In-State Bias?
Given that overweighting in-state stocks increases risk to taxpayers (as measured by the correlation between investment returns and the growth in tax revenues), it is important to know whether state pension plans are able to generate excess returns on their stock holdings (consistent with an information-based story), or whether the in-state bias is welfare-reducing and largely driven by familiarity or political factors. Thus, we now turn to an analysis of investment performance.
As a starting point, we report in Table 5 In column 1 of Table 5 , we report the results from the CAPM model, in column 2 we report results from a 3-factor model that adds size and value factors (Fama and French, 1993) , and in column 3 we report the results from a 4-factor model that adds a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997) . These return analyses suggest that relative to the market portfolio, the selfmanaged state plans tend to overweight large stocks and underweight small stocks (consistent with the portfolio shares documented in Table 3 ). We do not find strong evidence of any other "style" investing: the coefficients on the value and momentum factors are rather small in magnitude even though they are statistically significant. We also find in Table 5 that the alpha, or risk-adjusted performance, of the overall stock portfolio of state pension plans is insignificantly different from zero and small in magnitude. Thus, in aggregate, state pension plan portfolios mimic the U.S. stock market, with a slight tilt towards large-cap stocks.
The more detailed analysis in likely know more about oil/energy firms than do New York pension plan managers). In particular, we would expect this advantage to be stronger in smaller (non-S&P 500) stocks that have less of a national reputation and receive less coverage from professional analysts.
We begin by looking at holdings in panel A of Table 6 . Across all industries (the first row), the alphas are not significantly different across in-state and out-of-state investments.
Consistent with the hypothesis that it is difficult to have or maintain an information advantage for larger, more well-known stocks, there is no significant difference in the alphas for S&P 500 firms across in-state and out-of-state investments. Although the difference in performance across within-state and out-of-state holdings for non-S&P 500 firms is larger than it is for S&P 13 All risk-adjusted returns (i.e., alpha) reported in Tables 6, 7 , and 10 are obtained from a 4-factor model. 500 firms (rising from 4 basis points per month in column 6 to 16 basis points in column 9), it just misses statistical significance (p-value = 0.11).
In row 2 of Table 6 , we focus on the largest industry in a state. Here, evidence of information-based selection of stocks surfaces. We find that investments made in stocks that are in the largest home-state industry of the pension plan, the in-state portion of the portfolio significantly outperforms the out-of-state portion of the portfolio. While this is true for both S&P and non-S&P firms, the advantage is more pronounced for the smaller stocks. Specifically, we find that in-state, non-S&P 500 stocks from the state's largest industry outperform out-ofstate small stock investments from the same industry by 53 basis points per month, or an annual difference of 6.5 percentage points (roughly twice the differential found for S&P 500 stocks).
A natural question is whether this performance is due to the in-state location or simply due to close geographic proximity. To address this, we have also compared (in results not shown) in-state holdings with holdings from neighboring states (e.g., oil holdings in Texas to oil holdings in Oklahoma from the perspective of the Texas plan). The difference in risk-adjusted returns of in-state and neighbor-state holdings in the largest home-state industry is a statistically significant 0.47% per month for all stock holdings, and 0.58% for non-S&P 500 stocks. Thus, it is the actual in-state location that is important, not geographic proximity that is linked to the superior stock selection -any information-based portfolio holdings seem to stop at the state boundary.
Whereas panel A focused on holdings, panel B of Table 6 focuses on stocks that the pension fund purchased during the prior quarter. We define a purchase of a stock as an increase in the number of shares of stock held by the fund from the start to the end of the prior quarter, adjusted for stock splits. We calculate monthly returns, aggregated across all state pension funds, for the three months following the purchase made in the prior quarter. 14 As with holdings, we find no differences in the performance between in-state and out-of-state stock purchases across all industries, but strong differences in the stocks purchased from the largest industry in the plan's home state. In particular, we find a 1.16 percentage point difference in monthly returns between in-state and out-of-state stocks purchased over the prior quarter. This is an extremely large difference in performance that is driven both by superior performance of in-state stock purchases (+0.72) and underperformance of out-of-state purchases (-0.43) within the largest industry.
The prior analysis was based on comparing in-state and out-of-state stocks held by the plans, another way to assess the presence of information-based investing is to test whether these self-managed state plans are able to choose the better stocks and shun the worse stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001 , conduct such an analysis for mutual fund managers). We examine this issue in Table 7 by comparing the performance of the stocks in which state pensions chose to invest relative to those that they avoided, for various types of stock investments.
The evidence in Table 7 is striking: for in-state stocks -and especially for smaller instate stocks or in-state stocks from the largest state industry -pension funds appear to be able to differentially choose between winners and losers (and indeed, they seem particularly adept at avoiding the losers 
Political Considerations
Despite some efforts to isolate state pension funds from political interference, state pension fund management is nonetheless potentially subject to political considerations. These considerations could be quite explicit -such as outright corruption (e.g., sharing of inside information, states investing in companies in return for political support, etc.) -or it could be much more subtle -such as investment managers simply have more exposure to the leadership of well-connected companies (particularly those that share similar political leanings).
Finding systematic evidence of outright corruption is difficult because empirical work is limited by the fact that those who engage in corrupt behavior have an obvious incentive to hide their actions from the public, and thus from researchers. Until quite recently, researchers circumvented this problem primarily by using variation in the amount of corruption perceived by the public. 15 Olken (2009) Of course, political connections and influence can affect firm value even in the absence of outright corruption. Indeed, a number of papers have used event studies to show that political connections affect firm value. Roberts (1990) provides evidence that U.S. politicians with seniority can provide benefits to specific firms by documenting a differential stock-price reaction 15 Rose-Ackerman (2005) provides a review of this literature. 16 Other studies of corruption in the development literature include Fisman and Wei (2004) , Reinikka and Svennson (2004) , Olken and Barron (2007) , and Tran (2008) .
to the news of the death of Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, the powerful chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Jayachandran (2006) uses soft-money donations to national parties as a measure of a firm's political alignment and finds that that for every $250,000 a firm gave to Republicans, the firm lost 0.8% of its market valuation when Senator Jeffords switched parties in 2001. Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) find that firms that make federal campaign contributions subsequently earn higher returns and conclude that "… the contribution effect appears to increase for firms that have longer relationships with candidates, that support more home candidates, and support more powerful candidates (p. 689)." Kim (2015) shows that the unexpected exit of a member of Congress leads to a decline in firm value for companies whose lobbyist used to work for that member. In a non-U.S. context, Fisman (2001) estimates the value of political connections by examining share price reactions to the end of Suharto's reign.
We are interested in whether public pension plan investment decisions, and the returns earned on those investments, are influenced by political considerations. Because governors are often in a position to select or influence the members of the governing boards of state pension plans, we collect data on campaign contributions and votes from gubernatorial elections. were not particularly close because it helps assess a county's relative support for the Governor.
For reference, Figure 1 shows the probability that a state pension plan holds a particular type of stock (averaged across all plans and all quarters). The probability of a state pension holding any stock is 17.8%. This probability rises to 24.8% for stocks that are in-state. Further, we find that the probability of being held in a state's pension portfolio is 31.1% for in-state stocks from the state's largest industry. This is nearly double the probability of an out-of-state stock from the largest industry in the plan's home state being held (16.6%).
With these tabulations as background information, we test how holding probabilities vary with the flow of campaign contributions and votes. We start in Table 8 with an OLS regression of the likelihood that a state pension plan holds an in-state stock in its portfolio. The first column focuses on all in-state stocks, whereas the second column focuses on the in-state stocks of the largest industry. The dependent variable is set to one if the in-state stock is held in a given pension plan's portfolio that quarter and is set to zero if the in-state stock is not held by the given pension plan during the quarter. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 so they represent percentage points. Regressions include both plan-by-quarter fixed effects (to control for a plan's average likelihood of holding in-state stocks in a given quarter) and firm-county fixed effects (to control for county-level characteristics that do not vary over time). For example, given the inclusion of county-level fixed effects in the regression, the campaign contribution and vote variables are identified by changes in donation patterns and electoral outcomes within a given county over time (as opposed to simple cross-sectional differences across counties within a state).
The first pattern to note from Table 8 is that campaign contributions matter significantly for in-state pension plan portfolio decisions, particularly those in the largest industry in the state.
In contrast, measures of voting outcomes from the last gubernatorial election have no significant effect on in-state pension holdings. Focusing on the results in the first column for all in-state stocks, the stock of a firm located in a county that gave most of its campaign contributions to the current Governor last election is a statistically significant 0.9 percentage points more likely to be held by the state pension plan (or 1.7 percentage points more likely if the firm was further located in a country that gave a higher fraction of contributions to the current governor than the statewide average). The most striking result is that an in-state stock in the largest industry is 2.8
percentage points more likely to be held in the state's portfolio if the county in which that company is headquartered gave a disproportionately large share of campaign contributions to the Governor (i.e., 4.3-1.5=2.8, p-value = 0.02). This 2.8 percentage point increase represents almost 10% of the baseline likelihood of the state plan holding such a stock. Also, the highly significant coefficient of 4.3 on whether the Governor received a higher fraction of campaign contributions from that county than statewide and the insignificant coefficient on the simple gave-majority-of-contributions variable, suggest that it is the relative-share variable that is most important for influencing the plan's in-state portfolio decisions of these firms.
The in-state holding regressions reported in Table 8 also include firm-level and additional county-level controls. Not surprisingly, larger firms headquartered in the state (whether measured by market cap or number of employees) are more likely to be held in the state pension plan. We also include several county-of-firm controls to be sure that the campaign contribution results are driven by political considerations and do not reflect other factors (such as state pension plans investing in firms from better-off counties). We find that for firms in the largest industry of the state, the state plan is significantly more likely to hold the stock of firms located in counties with a higher level of campaign donations and higher median income (these effects are insignificant for the "in-state holding" regression). The key takeaway is that even after controlling for various measures of the wealth and size of a county where a firm is headquartered, the share of campaign contributions that went to the current governor is an important predictor of a stock being in the state pension plan.
To further increase confidence that these results are driven by political considerations, Table 9 expands on the Table 8 results. In Table 9 , we focus on holdings of stocks in the largest industry of the pension fund's home state, with the first two columns considering in-state holding decisions and the last two columns considering out-of-state holding decisions for this group of stocks. In the first column of Table 9 , we revisit the result that companies in the state's largest industry are more likely to be held by the state pension fund if the Governor received a disproportionate share of campaign contributions in the prior election cycle. In the second column, we add a control for the number of times the home state was mentioned in the firm's 10-k, as a fraction of all state mentions, a measure developed by Garcia and Norli (2012) to control for the degree of economic concentration in the state. Including this control has virtually no effect on the coefficient related to campaign contributions, and the home-state mention variable itself is insignificant. This result likely reflects the fact that in-state firms from the state's largest industry are already well known to the state pension fund.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 , we analyze the holding decisions of out-of-state stocks from the largest industry in the pension fund's home state. For these out-of-state stocks, the campaign contribution and vote outcome variables reflect political attitudes of the firm's home state (which is, by definition, different from the home state of the pension plan making the holding decision). 18 Under our political-consideration hypothesis, the campaign contributions to the Governor in the home state of the pension plan should affect holding decisions of in-state stocks, but the flow of campaign contributions to the Governors of other states should not influence a given pension plan's out-of-state holdings. We indeed find, for out-of-state stocks in the largest industry of the home state of the pension fund, that there is no relation between campaign contributions and vote outcomes and the likelihood that the out-of-state stock is held by the pension fund. These results clearly indicate that the patterns found in columns 1 and 2 -that campaign contributions from a firm's home county increase the likelihood of that in-state firm being held in the state pension portfolio -reflect within-state political considerations.
According to the results in columns 3 and 4, a state pension plan is more likely to hold an out-of-state stock if it is larger in size (whether based on S&P 500 status, market cap, or number of employees). Also, the more mentions of the home state of the pension plan in the 10-k of the out-of-state firm, the more likely is the plan to hold the stock. These state mentions could reflect that the out-of-state firm sells products or has operations in the home state of the pension plan and this familiarity may lead to inclusion in the pension plan portfolio.
Finally, we consider the role political considerations/connections may have on portfolio performance. In particular, we relate the return on in-state stock holdings to whether the firm was located in a county that gave a high share of campaign contributions last election to the current governor (above the statewide average). 19 As shown in the top panel of Table 10 , the performance of within-state investments is strongest for the counties that gave the current governor the highest fraction of their financial support. The stocks of in-state firms that gave a higher share of contributions to the Governor than the statewide share experienced a riskadjusted return of 0.22% per month, while the holdings of firms that are headquartered in counties that were less generous to the Governor underperform their benchmark by 0.23% per month. Thus, the difference in the performance of in-state holdings in politically-connected counties and those from counties that are less so is 46 basis points per month -both highly significant and economically substantive. This difference rises to 53 basis points per month (6.5% on an annual basis) for in-state firms in the largest industry of the state.
One explanation for this pattern of results is that counties that were generous to the current Governor during the last election receive economic development that benefits all firms in 19 Our campaign contributions and vote outcomes data cover the 1994, 1998, and 2002 elections. Thus, as discussed in an earlier footnote, the sample that uses this election data consists of stock holdings from the first quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 2006. Thus, the monthly return series calculated based on these quarterly holdings after the 1994, 1998, and 2002 elections spans April of 1995 to March of 2007.
the county (both those subsequently held and not held by the state pension plan). Under this hypothesis, there should be no difference in the performance of the stocks held and not held.
Thus, the differences in performance displayed in the last row should be zero, once we account for the return of the stocks not held by the pension plan. To test this possibility, in the right two columns of Table 10 , we report the returns on holdings of stocks held versus those that are not held for each category of in-state firms. We again find substantial and significant differences between the performance of in-state holdings in politically-connected counties and those from counties that are less so (on the order of 35 to 87 basis points per month). In sum, the ability of pension plans to differentiate good from bad in-state stock investments is much stronger in the counties that gave the strongest financial support to the Governor during the last election. This pattern suggests that some form of information is transmitted along a network that shares common connection points with the political power structure of the state.
Turning to bottom panel of Table 10 , we conduct a similar exercise using sample splits based on votes rather than campaign contributions. Unlike the flow of campaign contributions, the share of votes has absolutely no predictive power for the performance of within-state investments. This result mirrors our finding for state pension plan holdings; simply put, vote outcomes are not relevant while the flow of campaign contributions is important.
Conclusions
State pension plans that manage their own U.S. equity investments tilt their portfolios to stock holdings within the state to an even larger degree than other institutional investors. A significant portion of this within-state bias reflects an informational advantage, since the holdings of these pension plans, particularly their holdings in companies in the state's primary industry, outperform the stocks they choose not to hold by a wide margin. This differential is only found for investments made (or avoided) within the state, the domain in which the pension plan is more likely to have access to information about firm prospects. We find evidence that political influence may also play a substantial role in the stock selection process: state pension plans are more likely to hold a within-state firm in its portfolio if the county where the firm is located gave a high fraction of its campaign contributions in the last election to the current governor. Further, these politically-motivated within-state holdings yield excess returns for the pension fund. Even though data limitations preclude a more in-depth investigation of the channel through which political connections influence state pension plans, our results are broadly consistent with the importance of networking in fund management (as found in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008)) as well as the research on political contributions/connections and stock returns (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) ). Table 1 for the list of individual state pension plans filing form 13F and their sample coverage. The likelihoods displayed are averages across the full sample of state pension plan investment decisions. The largest home-state industry is the largest industry in the pension plan's home state based on total firm market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter with firms assigned to one of the 12 FamaFrench industries. Table 1 for the list of individual state pension plans filing form 13F and their sample coverage. The pension plan portfolio weights displayed in this table are calculated by first tabulating aggregate value-weighted portfolio weights across plans in a given quarter, and then averaging these aggregate portfolio weights across quarters. The largest home-state industry is the largest industry in the pension plan's home state based on total firm market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter with firms assigned to one of the 12 Fama-French industries. Table 1 for the list of individual state pension plans filing form 13F and their sample coverage. Thus, 1981 is the first full year an annual return on U.S. stock investments can be calculated for a state pension plan. The standard error of the coefficient estimate is in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated allowing for heteroskedasticity as well as two-way clustering by year and state of the pension plan. *** , ** , * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Plans, 4/1980 Plans, 4/ -12/2008 Table 1 for the list of individual state pension plans filing form 13F and their sample coverage. Thus, the monthly return series calculated based on these holdings spans April of 1980 to December of 2008. The standard error of the coefficient estimate is in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated allowing for heteroskedasticity as well time-series correlation in the error term over the prior four quarters (i.e., Newey-West standard errors). *** , ** , * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Stock buys in all industries Monthly returns of stocks held are aggregated across all pension plans based on pension plan holdings from the end of the prior quarter (weighted by the dollar amount of the holding). The monthly returns of the portfolio of stocks NOT HELD by a given pension plan last quarter is value-weighted by firm market cap. Each pension plan's NOT HELD return is then weighted by total equity assets of the pension plan to compute the aggregated NOT HELD return across all state pension plans for a given month. The displayed returns are risk-adjusted, that is, they are obtained from a four-factor return model that controls for market, firm size, firm value/growth, and momentum factors as in column 3 of Table 5 . The largest home-state industry is the largest industry in the pension plan's home state based on total firm market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter with firms assigned to one of the 12 FamaFrench industries. The standard error of the coefficient estimate is in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated allowing for heteroskedasticity as well time-series correlation in the error term over the prior four quarters (i.e., Newey-West standard errors). *** , ** , * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The dependent variable takes on the value one if the in-state stock is held in a given pension plan's portfolio that quarter and is zero if the in-state stock is not held by the given pension plan during the quarter. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 so they represent percentage points. The largest home-state industry is the largest industry in the pension plan's home state based on total firm market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter with firms assigned to one of the 12 Fama-French industries. Gubernatorial campaign contribution data (aggregated at the county level) are available for the 1994 , 1998 elections for California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania (1998 , Texas, and Wisconsin. Data on voting outcomes in gubernatorial elections covers the same elections (i.e., years and states). The standard error of the coefficient estimate is in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated allowing for heteroskedasticity as well as two-way clustering by pension plan and quarter. *** , ** , * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. This table presents monthly returns from in-state stock holdings aggregated across state pension plans. The top (bottom) panel presents the returns from in-state holdings by whether the firm is located in a county that gave a higher share of campaign contributions (votes) to the current governor during the last election than was the share of contributions (votes) received by the current governor statewide. Monthly returns of stocks held are aggregated across all pension plans based on pension plan holdings from the end of the prior quarter (weighted by the dollar amount of the holding). The right panel of the table presents monthly returns aggregated across state pension plans of stocks held minus the aggregated return of the stocks NOT HELD by plans in the different categories. The displayed returns are risk-adjusted, that is, they are obtained from a four-factor return model that controls for market, firm size, firm value/growth, and momentum factors as in column 3 of Table 5 . The largest home-state industry is the largest industry in the pension plan's home state based on total firm market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter with firms assigned to one of the 12 Fama-French industries. Gubernatorial campaign contribution data (aggregated at the county level) are available for the 1994 , 1998 elections for California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania (1998 , Texas, and Wisconsin. Data on voting outcomes in gubernatorial elections covers the same elections (i.e., years and states). State pension plan holdings are available every 3 months, so the monthly return series calculated based on these holdings after the 1994, 1998, and 2002 elections spans April of 1995 to March of 2007. The standard error of the coefficient estimate is in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated allowing for heteroskedasticity as well timeseries correlation in the error term over the prior four quarters (i.e., Newey-West standard errors). *** , ** , * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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